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Strategic sealift is critical for the United States to be able to project military power 
worldwide During the 1990 Persian Gulf War, over 95% of all military equipment arrived 
in theater via sealift The importance and difficulty of sealift planning has motivated the 
development of a number of decision aids. These aids, relying heretofore on a combination 
of heuristics and simulation, help determine for a given sealift mission the overall gross 
transportation feasibility. The key to this transportation feasibility is satisfying desired force 
closure — the time units arrive in the theater of operations. This thesis introduces 
optimization models to help plan ship schedules that deliver units as close as possible to their 
required arrival times. The prototypic models are demonstrated on a dual major regional 
conflict, obtaining near optimal solutions in less than two hours. 
VI 
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Strategie sealift is critical for the United States to be able to project military power 
worldwide. During the 1990 Persian Gulf War, over 95% of all military equipment arrived 
in theater via sealift   The importance and difficulty of sealift planning has motivated the 
development of a number of decision aids. These aids, relying heretofore on a 
combination of heuristics and simulation, help determine for a given sealift mission the 
overall gross transportation feasibility. The key to this transportation feasibility is 
satisfying desired force closure — the time units arrive in the theater of operations. The 
imprecise, heuristic nature of the current decision aides may lead them to incorrectly 
declare a desired force closure to be infeasible. 
This thesis develops optimization models to help plan ship schedules that deliver 
units as close as possible to the desired force closure dates. A ship schedule is a list of 
what units the ship picks up, what day it picks them up, where it picks them up, when it 
discharges them, and where it discharges them. The number of possible candidate ship 
schedules may be very large, for a given scenario, and could cause the subsequent 
optimization to be difficult. This thesis develops a schedule generator that produces only 
good candidate schedules. From this candidate set of ship schedules the optimization 
model selects the subset that delivers units as close as possible to their desired force 
closure date, while enforcing port capacities, and ensuring the movement of all units. 
XI 
By not considering every possible day a ship could pick up a unit, the number of 
candidate ship schedules is reduced. This restriction can cause a problem during 
optimization. There might be a set of good schedules that delivers every unit by its 
desired force closure, but on one day, in one port, there may be one too many ships. 
Here, it would be reasonable to delay one ship by one day. We deal with this by allowing 
a violation of the port capacities at a penalty. If there is a violation of a port capacity, 
xoi iL'al post processing determines which ship, at what port, and at what time the delay 
should occur. 
This thesis demonstrates sealift planning for both a single and a dual major regional 
conflict. The generation of ship schedules takes less than 25 minutes on a personal 
computer. Implementable ship schedules can be selected in less than two hours, and only 
minimal manual post processing and expert interpretation has been required. 
This thesis demonstrates that the critical assessment of transportation feasibility 
can be sharpened with optimization. Furthermore, reliable answers are obtainable in a 
relatively short amount of time (compared with most simulation models), and are face 
valid and usable as a basis for the execution of an Operations Plan. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis optimizes the scheduling of strategic sealift with respect to force 
closure and priority of units. Known data about unit transportation requirements and 
available sealift assets are used to produce optimal ship schedules. Prior to this thesis, 
there were only simulation models to help plan and execute strategic sealift. 
A. STRATEGIC SEALIFT 
1. Definition of Strategic Sealift 
Strategic sealift is the collection of ships designed and used for inter-theater 
shipment of military equipment [Military Sealift Command, 1992, p2]. The term strategic 
sealift can also denote the planning and execution of operations involving these ships. 
2. Importance of Strategic Sealift 
A critical component of the United States' (US) foreign policy is the ability to 
project military power throughout the world. The projection of military power is 
impossible without sealift. Historically, sealift moves the bulk of military cargo into a 
theater of operations. During the 1990 Persian Gulf War, over 95% of all military 
equipment arrived in theater via sealift [Pagonis, 1992, plO]. 
Currently, US military forces are being reduced to implement the Bottom Up 
Review [Aspin, 1993]. As a result, there are now fewer forward deployed units. This 
forces a greater reliance on sealift to get the US military forces to a theater of operations 
3. Strategic Sealift Assets 
a. Fast Sealift Ships 
The Fast Sealift Ship (FSS) (Figure 1.1) is a large combination Roll-On/ 
K)ll-Off (RO/RO) and Lift-On/Lift-Off (LO/LO) ship. (The Appendix lists all acronyms 
contained in this thesis.) It can carry up to 180,000 square feet of RO/RO unit equipment 
and ! 82 twenty-foot equivalent containers. RO/RO and container space is inter- 
changeable on a limited basis. The US currently has eight of these ships, and all are on 
active duty. 
Figure 1.1   The Fast Sealift Ship USNS Capella is underway during the 1990 Persian Gulf War. The forward 
part of the ship has six decks and can hold up to 180,000 square feet of Roll-On/ Roll-Off equipment. The aft 
part of the ship has four holds and can hold up to 182 twenty-foot equivalent containers. Scheduling the eight 
Fast Sealift Ships is critical during a deployment because of their relatively large cargo capacity and fast speed 
[Military Sealift Command, 1992, pi6]. 
b. Prepositioning Ships 
There are 11 ships with US Army equipment and 13 ships with US Marine 
Corps equipment pre-loaded. The bulk of these ships are in Diego Garcia and can respond 
very quickly to any contingency near that location. These ships (Figure 1.2) have different 
sizes, but are all designed to allow the military to establish a quick presence and to 
facilitate the follow-on surge to the theater of operation. These ships are available for 
general use after they unload their initial equipment in the theater of operation. 
„.»„...SgsasBS 
Figure 12. The Maritime Prepositioning Ship MV 1st LT Jack Lummus. United 
States Marine prepostioning ships, in combination with United States Army 
prepostioning ships, will likely be the first ships to enter a theater. United States Army 
versions carry key port opening packages that allow the use of the port by follow-on 
ships. After these ships unload their initial cargo, their subsequent scheduling and use 
is like any other ship type. [Military Sealift Command, 1992, pi7]. 
c. Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships 
There are 17 RO/RO ships (Figure 1.3) in the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) 
which vary in size   These ships carry unit equipment, and only a few twenty-foot 
equivalent containers. 
Figure 13   The MV Cape Ducato during a Joint Logistics Over the Shore exercise. The 
scheduling of Roll-On/ Roll-Off ships is important for deploying unit equipment (rolling 
stock). These are reserve ships and activation must occur before use. Once activated, 
these ships provide most of the United States capability to move unit equipment. [Military 
Sealift Command, 1992, p7]. 
d. Container and Break Bulk Ships 
There are 48 Break Bulk (BB) and 9 container ships (Figure 1.4) in the 
RRF. These are LO/LO ships and take considerably longer to load than the RO/RO ships 
with unit equipment. However, the container ships are large and can carry up to 820 
twenty-foot equivalent containers. 
Figure 1.4. The container ship SS Keystone State. Scheduling of container ships is 
normally more important during the sustainment phase of an operation. Container ships 
carry up to 820 twenty-foot equivalent containers. Like the Roll-On/ Roll-Off, ships they 
are in the reserve, and activation must occur before use. Break Bulk ships are older, 
slower, and carry less cargo than any other class of ship. The scheduling of the reserve 
Break Bulk ships is a last resort. [Military Sealift Command, 1992, pi9]. 
e. Location of the Ready Reserve Fleet 
The RRF is split between many locations in the continental US to allow 
flexibility for future deployments. Figure 1.5 shows the locations of the RRF, and Table 







Figure 1.5. The Ready Reserve Fleet is located to allow flexibility during operations. The 
Ready Reserve Fleet requires activation by the Secretary of Defense before use. 
Scheduling these ships is critical during most deployments. 
Location FSS PREPO BB Container RO/RO 
James 
River, VA 
15 3 6 
Beaumont, 
TX 
10 3 5 
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TOTAL 8 24 48 9 17 
Table 1.1. Locations and numbers of ships in the Ready Reserve Fleet and on active duty 
as of 1 JAN 95 [Kaskin, 1995, p23]. These ships represent the total military strategic 
sealift assets of the US. The scheduling of these limited assets is critical during any 
deployment. 
B. STRATEGIC SEALIFT PLANNING 
1. Operations Plan Development 
The US military divides the world into regions. Each region is the responsibility 
of one Unified Command with its own Commander-In-Chief (CINC). Each CINC has 
many Operations Plans (OPLANs) (war contingency plans defining US military actions) 
detailing various responses to potential conflicts in his region. An important part of these 
plans is the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). This data includes 
information such as the time each military unit is ready to load on ships, the earliest and 
latest time the unit can be off-loaded, and the size of the deploying unit. 
The Joint Operational Planning System (JOPES) [Department of Defense, 1993] 
builds and maintains a TPFDD for each OPLAN. This system uses the requirements 
identified by the CINCs, and documents the entire deployment. 
2. United States Transportation Command 
United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is a unified command 
with elements from all the military services. One major mission of USTRANSCOM, in 
support of the different CINCs, is to determine transportation feasibility for each OPLAN. 
The most important consideration is force closure. In this context, force closure is the 
date a unit is completely in the theater of operations. Each unit has an earliest arrival date 
in a theater (EAD) and a latest arrival date in a theater (LAD). Other factors limiting 
transportation feasibility include the various ship lengths, speeds, configurations (usable 
container space and RO/RO space), and usable pier space at each various port (total feet 
of pier space)   Using different simulation models, USTRANSCOM seeks a feasible way 
to deliver all the units on time. If no feasible plan is discovered, and the OPLAN is not 
allowed more strategic sealift or airlift assets, the supported CINC decides which units can 
arrive later than originally scheduled. This data is then conveyed to JOPES, and 
maintained by USTRANSCOM for later execution. 
C. STRATEGIC SEALIFT EXECUTION 
1. Military Sealift Command 
The OPLAN's strategic sealift execution is the responsibility of the Military Sealift 
Command (MSC). MSC is a subordinate of USTRANSCOM and its major responsibility 
is the RRF MSC issues orders to the ships to load units at specific ports at specific times 
[MSC, 1992, p6]. 
2. Operations Plan Execution 
Because more details become available during OPLAN execution, the OPLAN is 
modified on the fly. This can cause drastic changes to the TPFDD. It is common for the 
TPFDD to continue to change throughout the deployment [Pagonis, 1992, p72]. 
Currently, MSC implements all changes manually, relying on the experience of MSC 
planners and the ship crews. 
D. DIFFICULTIES IN STRATEGIC SEALIFT PLANNING AND EXECUTION 
1. Experiences During the 1990 Persian Gulf War 
During the 1990 Persian Gulf War the force size grew dramatically, highlighting an 
acute shortage of sealift. The use of foreign ships, in combination with those that the US 
owned, met the requirements of the war [Pagonis, 1992, plO]. Without this external help 
it would have öeen difficult to complete the same mission [Pagonis, 1992, p215]. 
A critical problem was the activation of the RRF. The RRF operates according to 
the Readiness Operating Status (ROS). Each ship's ROS is the number of days it takes to 
ready itself to sail   Unfortunately, the RRF's record during the 1990 Persian Gulf War was 
poor   Often the times needed to activate ships were much longer than expected. Even 
when a reserve ship was finally ready, qualified merchant mariners were often unavailable 
to sail it [Pagonis, 1992, p216]. 
During the war the VII Corps (consisting of four armor and mechanized infantry 
divisions) deployed from Germany. The distance between Germany and Saudi Arabia (via 
the Suez Canal) is only about half the distance between the US and Saudi Arabia. It 
required over 60 ships (almost half the total requirement of the entire war) to transport the 
VII Corp's unit equipment [Pagonis, 1992, pl35]. Currently the US Army has less than 
one corps remaining in Europe compared to more than two army corps in 1990. 
Therefore, another sealift of this size would take even longer or require more ships. 
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2. Improvements to Strategic Sealift Since the 1990 Persian Gulf War 
Resolution of some glaring problems in strategic sealift occurred after the 1990 
Persian Gulf War. In 1992 Congress approved funding to procure an additional 17 Large 
Medium Speed RO/RO (LMSR) ships [MSC, 1992, p21]. Six of these ships are to 
preposition US Army forces afloat, and the rest are for the RRF. This may not completely 
solve the problem because of two factors: all the ships will not be ready until the year 
2003, and many reserve ships are becoming very old and may not last until then. 
MSC has changed the ROS system to make it more realistic and responsive. Small 
crews have been assigned to the quick response ready reserve ships to maintain them. The 
crews must pass annual tests and get their ship ready to sail during the specified ROS 
time   The reduction in response time is encouraging, but on average the crews are still not 
meeting the deadlines imposed by the new ROS system [MSC, 1992, p20]. 
Considering the current state of the RRF, sealift is still a critical commodity to 
project a US military force. Improvements to the RRF are encouraging. However, the 
US military does not have (nor will it have in the near future) a surplus of sealift. The 
management of these ships is critical. 
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E. OBJECTIVE 
1. Thesis Objective 
Sealift is critical in any military deployment   Without sealift the US cannot project 
the bulk of its military forces overseas   Limited ships demand efficient use of strategic 
sealift planning and execution. This thesis suggests a tool to optimally determine force 
closure for any OPLAN. 
2. Thesis Outline 
This thesis has five chapters. Chapter I has defined strategic sealift while Chapter 
II covers related research. Chapter III covers the methodology used in this thesis. There 
are two main parts: generation of good candidate schedules, and the optimal selection of 
a workable set of schedules from the acceptable candidates. Chapter IV covers the results 
obtained using these models with data for both a single Major Regional Conflict (MRC) 
and a dual MRC. Chapter V contains conclusions, and the Appendix contains a list of 
acronyms. 
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II   RELATED RESEARCH 
There are three different types of existing models related to this thesis. The first 
answers questions about strategic sealift ship scheduling using simulation and heuristics. 
The second uses optimization modeling similar to this thesis. The last type of model 
generates the data needed for this thesis. 
A. SIMULATION MODELS 
1. Analysis Mobility Platform - Model for Intertheater Deployment by Air 
and Sea 
Analysis Mobility Platform - Model for Intertheater Deployment by Air and Sea 
(AMP-MIDAS) [GRC & Marcotte, 1992, pi] is a combination heuristic and simulation in 
wide use as a component of USTRANSCOM's Analysis Mobility Platform. It deals with 
both strategic airlift and strategic sealift during a deployment. AMP-MIDAS has the 
following multiple objectives: efficient use of strategic airlift and sealift assets, arrival of 
forces as soon as possible, sequential order of forces by unit required delivery date, 
supplies for sustainment, and unit integrity. 
Resolution of conflicts between its multiple objectives occurs by ranking. The 
highest ranked objective is the efficient use of airlift and sealift, followed by arrival of 
forces as soon as possible. Its purpose is to determine if a deployment is feasible. The 
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major deficiency with this approach (along with all simulation models) is that it may 
answer this question incorrectly by overlooking alternatives. 
2. Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation 
Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) [USTRANSCOM, 
1991, p2] is a simulation model in use at both USTRANSCOM and United States Army 
Logistics Evaluation Agency (USALEA). In much the same way as AMP-MIDAS, 
JFAST simulates a scenario and produces an assessment of transportation feasibility. 
3. FINDIT/FLOWIT 
FINDIT/FLOWIT [Caviller, 1994, p8] is a simulation model under development 
by Pennsylvania State University and USALEA.  The major advantage of this model over 
the other simulation models is that it takes less than 15 minutes to run, compared to hours 
for the other models. 
B. MOBILITY OPTIMIZATION MODELS 
1. Airlift Mobility Optimization Model 
An airlift mobility optimization model [Morton, Rosenthal, and Weng, 1995] 
optimally chooses the best schedules for aircraft. It minimizes the total weighted penalties 
for late deliveries and non-deliveries   The degree of lateness and the unit priority form the 
basis for these penalties. One major deficiency is that the model can produce fractional 
route sorties.  These fractional values correspond to fractional schedules for aircraft and 
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are not implementable This problem is currently under revision by the US Air Force and 
at the Naval Postgraduate School   Morton, Rosenthal, and Lim (1995) survey several 
other models for airlift. 
2. Scheduling the United States Atlantic Fleet 
Brown, Goodman, and Wood (1990) optimize US Atlantic Fleet annual 
employment scheduling. The problem is to match a diverse set of events to the set of 
ships eligible for participation in these events over an entire year. Candidate ship 
schedules are admissible for the subsequent optimization only if they meet a set of strict 
rules that greatly reduces their number. The most desirable subset of these candidate 
schedules is optimally chosen, while ensuring all the requirements for the events are met. 
This approach is similar to the one in this thesis. 
3. Flight Crew Scheduling 
There are numerous studies for commercial airline flight crew scheduling. Graves 
et. al. (1993) is a good example drawn from their work for United Airlines. A schedule is 
the assignment of air crews to scheduled flights. United Airlines uses a restricted forward 
enumeration to produce only a small subset of all possible alternate schedules by using 
heuristic rules to eliminate less desirable schedules. They then optimally choose the best 
subset of schedules. This subset is large, but nonetheless a restricted set of alternatives. 
Each possible schedule has a corresponding binary selection variable. If the optimizer 
chooses a schedule its corresponding binary variable is one, and zero if it is not chosen. 
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C. DATA GENERATION MODEL 
This thesis needs input data describing unit movements that includes the Port of 
Embarkation (POE), the Port of Debarkation (POD), the available to load date (ALD), 
and required delivery time. PAMM [Aviles, 1995] is a model that produces some essential 
elements of a TPFDD and answers these questions in an optimal manner. The basis for 
the PAMM optimization is force closure. Aviles does not deal with port size, ship speed, 
ship length, ship configuration (how much container space and RO/RO space is usable), or 
unit configuration explicitly, dealing with these factors implicitly instead. The results of 
Aviles's model are usable as input for the work reported here. 
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Ill    AN OPTIMIZATION MODEL FOR STRATEGIC SEALIFT 
The two primary parts of this thesis are a ship schedule generator, and an 
optimization model. A ship schedule is a list of voyages including what units the ship 
picks up, what day it picks them up, where it picks them up, when it discharges them, 
where it discharges them, and how much penalty is accrued by these deliveries. The 
optimization model optimally chooses from all supplied candidate ship schedules the 
subset that yields the lowest total penalty. For operations that are larger than a few ships 
and units, the number of potential candidate schedules could easily become impractical. 
The use of an "intelligent" schedule generator can reduce the number of candidate 
schedules. 
A. SHIP SCHEDULES 
Each unit has a port where it must be loaded (POE), a time it is ready to be loaded 
(Available to Load Date (ALD)), a port where it must be discharged (POD), an earliest 
arrival and latest arrival date (EAD, LAD), and a priority. The unit priority corresponds 
to the importance of transporting the unit on time (a higher unit priority implies greater 
importance). Each ship schedule has an associated penalty which is composed of the 
earliness or lateness of a unit delivery modified by the unit's priority. The following is an 
example ship schedule that the optimization model uses: Ship 1 picks up unit 1, with 
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priority 1, at POE 1 , on day 7, and discharges it at POD 1, on day 27, with a voyage or 
leg penalty of 0 (the unit arrives within the interval EAD and LAD).  Ship 1 then returns 
to pick up unit 11, with priority 3, at POE 3, on day 46, and discharges it at POD 2, on 
day 67. This voyage or leg penalty is greater than zero because the unit is discharged after 
the unit's LAD. The ship schedule then receives a total penalty (a summation of the 
voyage or leg penalties). 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
There are a number of assumptions that apply to both the optimization model and 
the schedule generator: 
* Time increments are days. 
* A ship carries only one unit or a portion of one unit at a time (unit integrity). 
This suggests aggregation of the units so that units are bigger than the largest ship. After 
this aggregation, typical units require multiple ships for full transportation; 
* There is no chance of interdiction of any ship by the enemy, or that the ship will 
experience a mechanical failure; 
* All material handling equipment and the personnel required to load and 
discharge the ships are present. This allows the use of a mean load and off-load time by 
ship type; 
* The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) reports the broken stow 
factor for the ships and the ports is 25% (unusable percentage of the ship or port) 
[MTMC, 1992]   In other words, only 75% of the cargo space (RO/RO) is usable for the 
ships, and only 75% of the total feet of pier space is usable for the ports; and 
* All unit requirements for transportation are divided into two separate categories: 
twenty-foot equivalent containers (hereafter referred to as containers), and RO/RO 
combined with Break Bulk. 
C. OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
1. Indices 
*i Ships, (i= 1,2, ...,I); 
* c Count of the number of ships (c = 1,2,3,4); 
*e POE, (e= 1,2, . .   , E); 
*d POD, (d=l,2,      . ,D); 
* s Schedules, (s = 1, 2, .. ., S); and 
* t Time (in days), (t = 1, 2,    . . , T). 
2. Data 
* POE es, Feet of pier space used at POE e, by schedule s, 
during time t; 
* POD dst Feet of pier space used at POD d, by schedule s, 
during time t; 
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PEN 




Total penalty for ship i using schedule s; 
Total unit square feet (RO/RO & Break Bulk) 
moved by ship i, using schedule s, for unit u. This 
comes from the schedule generator and the ship 
characteristics; 
Total number of unit containers moved by ship i, 
using schedule s, for unit u. Determined as in 
MoveSQFTUu; 
Maximum usable feet of pier space at POD d, at 
time t, 
Maximum usable feet of pier space at POE e, at time 
* UVolSq 
* UCont., 
Total square feet (RO/RO, Break Bulk) in unit u; 
Total containers in unit u: 
* PORTEXCEEDc    Penalty for exceeding the port constraints by 1 ship 
more than c - 1; 
* CONTPEN 
* SQFTPEN 
Penalty per container not transported for all units; 
Penalty per square foot not transported for all units ; 
and 
* MAXSHIP 
3. Binary Variables 
The maximum length of all ships in feet. 
*PENPODcdt 
1 if ship i uses schedule s, or 0 otherwise; 
1 if the maximum number of usable feet of pier 
space at POD d at time t is exceeded by c or more 
ships, or 0 otherwise; and 
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* PENPOE cct 1 if the maximum number of usable feet of pier 
space at POE e at time t is exceeded by c or more 
ships, or 0 otherwise. 
4. Continuous Variables 
* DEVS u Amount of square feet of unit u not moved (an 
elastic constraint violation indicator); and 
* DEVC u Amount of containers of unit u not moved (an 
elastic constraint violation indicator). 
5. Model Formulation 
Minimize: (1) 
E PENj/Xi, + SQFTPENE DEVSU + CONTPENEDEVCU + 
i,s u u 
E PORTEXCEEDc* PENPOEc e, +EPORTEXCEEDC* PENPODcAt 
c,e, t ''   c,d,t 
Subject to the following constraints: 
E X,,s <\ Vi       (2) 
s 
E (MoveSQFTUn * X^) > UVolSqu + DEVSU V u      (3) 
E (MoveCont;AU * X;,s) t UContu + DEVCU V u      (4) 
i,s 
E (POEe s t * X^) < EMaxe t + MAXSHIPE PENPOE^,  V e,t    (5) 
1,S c 
E (POD4st * XJ < DMax4t +MAXSHIPEPENPODcd>t V d,t    (6) 
i,s c 
Xu e {0,1} V i,s;    PENPOEcet e {0,1} V c,e,t; 
PENPOD cAt e {0,1} V c,d,t;   DEVSU, DEVCU > 0 V u (7) 
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The objective function (1) minimizes the total penalty for all ships plus penalties 
for not moving all the units or exceeding port capacities. Constraint set (2) ensures each 
ship gets assigned at most one schedule. Constraint set (3) forces the total square feet 
moved (RO/RO & Break Bulk) by all ships to be greater than or equal to the square feet 
requirements for each unit or it suffers a penalty in the objective function with the elastic 
variable, DEVSU 
Constraint set (4) ensures that all unit containers are moved in the same way as the 
unit square feet   In implementation, the constants SQFTPEN and CONTPEN are 1,000 
and 10,000 respectively. The difference in the constants is a scaling factor which equates 
containers to square feet (each container has approximately 100 square feet of usable 
space)   These penalties equate a unmoved square foot to roughly discharging a ship's 
portion of a priority 3 unit 18 days after its LAD. This penalty scale shows the emphasis 
to move a unit even when the unit is discharged after its LAD 
Constraint sets (5) and (6) limit the maximum number of ships in a port at any 
time or incur an elastic penalty   The constant MAXSHIP is the length of the longest ship, 
a 1,100 foot FSS.  In the objective function, a progressively larger penalty is added for 
each of these ship lengths exceeding the port limit (PORTEXCEEDJ 
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D. SCHEDULE GENERATOR 
A lot of possible ship candidate schedules exist for a given scenario. A ship can load a 
unit on a number of days, discharge a unit on a number of days, and may make many trips 
to transport multiple units. The schedule generator follows a few simple rules to eliminate 
many candidate schedules and keep only those that discharge units close to the time 
window between its EAD and LAD. The basis for this determination is a schedule 
penalty. Every schedule is given a penalty cost of at least one, so that the optimization 
breaks ties by using the smallest number of candidate schedules (ships) possible. 
1. Ship Schedule Penalty 
The ship schedule penalty derives from unit delivery dates achieved and unit 
priorities. It is desirable for ships to completely discharge units between their EAD and 
LAD.  If a ship discharges a unit (or portion of a unit it is carrying) before its EAD, then 
the ship schedule accrues a small penalty (one). If a ship discharges a unit between the its 
EAD and LAD there is no incremental penalty. However, if a ship does not discharge a 
unit until after its LAD, the ship schedule accumulates a progressively larger penalty. 
Here, the added penalty is the square of the number of days the ship discharges the unit 
after LAD. For example, if the unit is three days late, the added penalty is nine. 
A user defined unit priority modifies these penalties.   The units for this thesis 
receive a priority between one and three with three being the highest. The unit priority 
multiplies its lateness penalty. These penalties are cumulative for all units the ship 
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transports, and if they ever exceed a user defined threshold the candidate ship schedule is 
discarded   Here, this threshold is 1,000 which is equivalent to a priority 3 unit being 
discharged approximately 18 days after its LAD   This restriction may possibly cause the 
problem to be infeasible if this threshold is set too low. 
2. Limits on Ship Schedule Generation for Loading Units 
If a unit waits longer to load than a user defined maximum number of days, the 
schedule generator does not allow a ship to load the unit. This shortens the total ship 
schedule generation time by not generating less desirable candidate schedules. Here, this 
maximum unit waiting is 3 to 14 days past its ALD 
3. Limits on Ship Schedule Generation for Discharging Units 
The discharge time follows the time when a ship begins to load a unit, the ship's 
load time, the ship's travel time from the POE to the POD, and the time it takes to 
discharge the ship   If the discharge time exceeds the maximum late discharge time (14 
days herein) the ship schedule is considered infeasible. Otherwise, the schedule generator 
computes the ship schedule penalty 
4. Delaying Ship Schedules 
The schedule generator loads and discharges each unit as soon as it is possible. 
However, delaying a ship from loading or discharging a unit for a day or number of days 
can also produce feasible candidate schedules   A delay in discharge times may change the 
voyage or leg penalty, and produces an entirely new schedule. These delays could occur 
at either the POE or POD (in any combination) until the discharging of the unit is more 
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than 14 days after the unit's LAD for each voyage or leg of the ship schedule.  Delaying 
ships can be advantageous in relieving port congestion (number of ships in a port on a 
given day), but increases the total number of ship candidate schedules generated. 
a. Explicit Delay Generation 
This thesis limits loading or discharging delays to three days. Even with 
this limitation, there are approximately 27 times more ship candidate schedules than 
without delay. 
h. Implicit Delay Generation 
One way not to generate so many candidate schedules is to implicitly 
consider delaying a ship. The use of the variables PENPOEcet and PENPOD C(M implicitly 
mimics ships waiting to load or discharge units. The penalties associated with these 
variables show the emphasis to not violate port capacities unless there is a substantial 
reward. This reward typically is either to ensure the movement of all units, or a large 
overall improvement on the unit delivery times. 
When variables PENPOE c e, or PENPOD c d, are one, this implies that a ship must 
wait to load or discharge a unit. Each PENPOE cel and PENPODC><M explicitly states 
which port (d or e), at what time (t), and by how many ships (c) a port capacity is 
violated. A post analysis of the selected ship schedules allow a decision maker to decide 
which ship(s) to delay in order to satisfy the port capacities (if needed). This post analysis 
is relatively easy if only a few of the PENPOE cel and PENPOD C(M variables have value 
one (a situation expected for an implementable TPFDD). Explicit generation would be 
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needed when many of these variables have value one to provide the optimization model 
greater flexibility 
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IV COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
All data used for this thesis is unclassified. The ship schedule generator is written 
in Pascal [Cooper, 1992]   The schedule generator runs on a personal computer and writes 
the mixed integer problem to a file in MPS format [Schräge, 1986]. An IBM RS6000 
model 590 workstation is used with the CPLEX optimizer [CPLEX Optimization, INC., 
1994] to collect the MPS model data and render solutions. 
A.  EXAMPLE SEALIFT PLANS 
1. Single Major Regional Conflict 
The sealift ships for the single Major Regional Conflict (MRC) are all currently 
available for use by the US military   A summary of the ship characteristics is in Table 4.1. 
USALEA provided the unit data (TPFDD) for this scenario. Table 4.2 shows the unit 
data after aggregation. This aggregation occurs only with units in the TPFDD that have 
the same ALD, POE, POD, EAD, and LAD. The port data in Table 4.3 is fictitious, 
representing average size deep water (50 feet) ports. 
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1 - X 1'SS 3 2 2 27 29 946 163,200 182 
9 -   19 RO   RO 10 1 1 23.3 30 705 152.250 30 
20 - 25 RO'RO 15 1 1 23.3 30 705 152,250 30 
26 - 73 BB 20 4 4 20.4 32 565 53,970 30 
74-82 CONT 20 4 4 20 33 668 0 894 
Table 4.1. Ship Characteristics for use in the single Major Regional Conflict scenario. 
The arrangement of these ships is by class. For example the Fast Sealift Ship USNS 
Capella is ready for use on day 3 (Entry Day), takes 2 days to load and discharge (Load 
and Unload Day), sustains 27 KNOTS (Speed), it draws 29 feet (Draft), is 946 feet long 
(Length), carrying 163,200 square feet of unit equipment (Usable SQ FT), and 182 
containers (CONT). The data is from the Military Traffic Management Command and 
reflects average data from the 1990 Persian Gulf War.  The usable square feet includes a 
25% broken stow factor. 
UNIT# SQ FT CONT POE POD ALD LAD EAD 
1 408,105 175 2 2 7 24 20 
2 453,895 221 2 1 11 28 24 
3 453,895 220 2 2 13 30 24 
4 453.895 220 2 1 15 32 24 
5 398,899 331 3 2 15 35 31 
6 75,014 22 1 1 17 33 32 
7 369,179 84 1 1 18 38 32 
X 174,910 41 1 1 21 40 36 
9 451,750 437 4 1 25 46 42 
10 451,750 437 4 2 28 49 45 
Table 4.2 Unit characteristics for the single Major Regional Conflict scenario. Units in the 
Time Phased Force Deployment Data which share the same Available to Load Date 
(ALD), Port of Embarkation (POE), Port of Debarkation (POD), Earliest Arrival Date 
(EAD), and Latest Arrival Date (LAD) have been aggregated reducing the original 32 
units to 10. Maintaining unit integrity (not splitting units which have different POEs 
between ships unless necessary) is still possible. Unit names are omitted so the data 
remains unclassified. 
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PORT NUMBER USABLE PIER SPACE 
(FEET) 






POD-  1 5,250 
2 7,875 
DISTANCE 1 BETWEEN PORTS (In Nautical Miles) 
POE/ 
POD 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 4,200 9,807 8,276 10,825 8,825 8,424 
2 4,200 9,807 8,276 10,825 8,825 8,424 
Table 4.3 Port characteristics for the single Major Regional Conflict scenario. This table 
defines the ports that the units (Table 4.2) require. The depth and berth lengths of the 
ports are representative of average size deep water (50 feet) ports. The distances 
represent average distances from different United States military ports to a port in Asia. 
2. Dual Major Regional Conflict 
Table 4.4 lists the strategic sealift for the dual MRC scenario. This scenario uses 
the two new LMSR class ships. The Fort Leavenworth theater level exercise Prairie 
Warrior 95 [Command and General Staff College, 1995] provided unit data (TPFDD) for 
this scenario. Unit data is aggregated in the same way as the single MRC scenario (Table 
4.5). This data clearly shows a division of the two MRCs at unit number 19. The port 
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data in Table 4 6 is fictitious, representing average size (9,750 feet of usable pier space) 
deep water (50 feet) ports 















1 - X FSS 3 2 2 27 29 946 163,200 182 
9 -   19 RO   RO 10 1 1 23.3 30 705 152,250 30 
20- 2? RO   RO 15 1 i 23.3 30 705 152,250 30 
26 - 73 BB 20 4 4 204 32 565 53,970 30 
74^X2 CONT 20 4 4 20 33 668 0 894 
X3 - 93 LMSR#1 3 2 2 22 34 1300 292,500 180 
94 - 99 LMSR//2 3 2 2 22 34 1200 243,000 180 
Table 4.4.  Ship Characteristics for the dual Major Regional Conflict scenario. The 
difference between this table and Table 4 1 is the addition of the two Large Medium 
Speed RO/RO (LMSR) ships. These ships are to correct the shortages apparent during 
the 1990 Persian Gulf War   The activation of these ships should occur between 1997 and 
2003   Without these ships it is impossible to complete the strategic sealift requirements 
for this scenario 
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UNIT# SQFT CONT POE POD ALD LAD EAD 
1 281,476 131 1 1 7 26 22 
2 1,712,772 795 2 2 7 28 22 
937,159 435 3 1 7 26 22 
4 276,225 130 4 1 7 26 22 
5 617,579 287 5 2 7 26 22 
6 246,955 115 6 1 7 26 22 
7 1,712,772 795 2 2 10 29 25 
8 196,940 91 2 1 22 41 37 
9 139,465 65 3 2 22 41 37 
10 47,154 22 5 1 22 41 37 
11 50,095 23 1 2 22 41 37 
12 114,220 33 6 1 22 41 37 
13 96,985 45 1 1 37 56 52 
14 693,313 322 2 2 37 56 52 
15 283,883 132 3 2 37 56 52 
16 69,601 32 4 1 37 56 52 
17 532,150 247 5 2 37 56 52 
18 97,768 46 5 1 47 66 52 
Table 4 5 A Unit characteristics for the dual Major Regional Conflict scenario for the first 
18 units (the remaining units are in Table 4.5.B). Aggregation of the units from the 
TPFDD in Prairie Warrior 95 reduced the number of units from 62 to 31. There is a clear 
division of the two different MRCs between unit 18 and unit 19: units 1-18 discharge at 
Ports of Debarkation 1 or 2, while units 19-31 discharge at Port of Debarkation 3. 
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19 48,904 23 2 3 57 76 72 
20 50,832 24 5 3 57 76 72 
21 135,442 63 1 3 67 86 82 
22 620,498 288 2 3 67 86 82 
23 320,973 149 3 3 67 86 82 
24 332,092 154 5 3 67 86 82 
25 127,849 63 5 3 77 96 92 
26 145,330 68 3 3 87 106 104 
27 169,034 79 5 3 87 106 104 
28 175,932 82 1 3 97 116 114 
29 957,778 445 2 3 97 116 114 
30 779,655 362 3 3 97 116 114 
31 153,786 71 5 3 97 116 114 
Table 4.5.B Unit characteristics for the dual Major Regional Conflict scenario for units 
19-31.  The other units are in Table 4.5.A. 
DISTANCE 1 BETWEEN PORTS (In Nautical Miles) 
POE/ 
POD 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 4,200 9,807 8,276 10,825 8,825 8,424 
2 4,200 9,807 8,276 10,825 8,825 8,424 
3 9200 4,200 4,200 3,200 4,200 4,200 
Table 4.6 Port characteristics for the dual Major Regional Conflict scenario. The lengths 
of the ports represent the size of average (9,750 feet of usable pier space) deep water (50 
feet) ports in the world. The distances represent average distances between the United 
States military ports and ports in Asia and the Middle East. 
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B. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
The implementation of both the single MRC and dual MRC scenario includes the 
two forms of schedule generation (implicit and explicit delay) giving four different sets of 
results 
1. Single Major Regional Conflict 
a.  Implicit Delay Generation 
The maximum number of days late to pick up a unit is 14 for this scenario, 
resulting in 567 candidate ship schedules generated in 45 seconds. CPLEX optimized the 
associated mixed integer program (567 rows, 719 columns, and 4711 coefficients) in 137 
seconds (with an integrality gap of 6.33%). The integrality gap is the difference between 
the objective function value of the best feasible solution identified and a lower bound on 
the objective function value (not necessarily a feasible solution), expressed as a percentage 
of the lower bound. The resulting unit ship assignments are in Table 4.7. There is no 
violation of any port constraint in the solution 
A positive square foot or containers excess in Table 4.7 signifies that there is more 
ship space available for the set of ships moving the unit. Two units have a negative square 
feet excess (units 1, and 8) and therefore are not fully transported. However, each unit 
has excess container space that can be used for square feet (on a limited basis) so the units 
can be transported. 
33 
Units 3, 4, and 5 have a negative container excess. There appears to be enough 
excess square feet to transport these containers. 
UNIT SI IIP DISCHARGE 
DATE 




1 5 26 2 
6 26 2 
-81,705 189 
2 2 30 2 
10 31 
19 31 3 13,805 21 
3 12 33 3 
16 33 3 
17 33 3 2,855 -130 
4 13 35 3 
22 35 3 
25 35 3 2,855 -130 
5 4 32 0 
14 32 0 
24 32 0 68,801 -89 
6 33 37 4 
41 37 4 32,926 38 
Table 4.7. A.  Ship schedules chosen for first six units in the single Major Regional 
Conflict, using the implicit delay generation (the remaining units are in Table 4.7.B). Each 
unit has multiple ships that transport it. Each ship has a discharge date (Discharge Date) 
which determines the number of days a unit is late (Days Late) in comparison to the unit's 
LAD. The excess square feet and excess containers represent unused space in the 
collection of ships that transported a particular unit.  A negative number in either column 
represents unit equipment that is not moved. To a small degree the container space and 
square feet space on a ship can be interchangeable, and therefore a tradeoff between the 
two can occur. A comparison between any unit that has negative excess space in one 
category and positive excess space in the other reveals that all units can be transported. 
These ship schedules are implementable. 
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UNIT SHIP DISCHARGE 
DATE 




7 32 37 0 
36 37 0 
43 37 0 
45 37 0 
50 37 0 
56 37 0 
65 37 0 8,611 126 
8 47 38 0 
48 38 0 
63 38 0 -13,000 49 
9 1 46 0 
3 46 0 
9 46 0 26,900 0 
10 7 48 0 
10 48 0 
21 49 0 26,900 0 
Table 4.7.B. Ship schedules chosen for units 7 
using implicit delay generation. 
10 in the single Major Regional Conflict, 
b.  Explicit Delay Generation 
The explicit delay generation single MRC scenario allows units to be 
loaded up to 3 days after their ALD. For this scenario, 784 candidate ship schedules were 
generated in 525 seconds, and CPLEX optimized the mixed integer program (784 rows, 
1,447 columns, and 14,119 coefficients) in 6,440 seconds (with an integrality gap of 
9.21%).  Unit ship assignments are in Table 4.8. In the original results, unit 6 required 
35 
two ships, but the second ship carried only five containers, and the first ship had excess 
square feet.  Only one ship is needed and Table 4.8 reflects this change. 
There are seven units that do not get all of their cargo moved (units 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 8, and 9).  Substituting container and square feet space, units 3, 4, 5, 8, an 9 can still 
be transported. There are not enough ship schedules to transport units 1 or 2 when only 
allowing schedules to load units 3 days after their ALD. From the implicit generation 
results (up to 14 day delay after ALD), we know that all units can be transported more 
than 3 days past ALD. However, explicit generation of all these candidate schedules is 
time consuming. The resulting optimization models have many more binary variables and 
therefore were both more difficult to read into CPLEX and to solve. 
36 








1 7 26 2 -244,905 7 
2 1 30 2 -290,695 -39 
3 2 32 2 
5 32 2 -127,495 144 
4 8 34 2 -127,495 144 
5 10 32 0 
12 32 0 
13 32 0 
15 32 0 
21 32 0 
24 32 0 
25 32 0 666,851 -67 
6 26 38 5 77,146 0 
7 27 37 0 
29 37 0 
39 38 0 
45 38 0 
51 38 0 94,940 0 
Table 4.8. A. Ship schedules chosen for first seven units in the single Major Regional 
Conflict, using explicit delay generation (the remaining units are in Table 4.8.B). A 
comparison between any unit that has negative excess space in one category and positive 
excess space in the other reveals that all units except 1 and 2 can be transported. This 
makes these ship schedules non-implementable (unless units 1 and 2 need not fully 
deploy). Implicit delay generation provides better results since it implicitly considers many 
more possible schedules with far fewer binary variables and requires only minimal post 
processing. 
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8 28 38 0 
31 38 0 
69 38 0 
-13,000 49 
9 3 46 0 
14 46 0 
16 46 0 15,950 -195 
10 4 49 0 
6 49 0 
9 49 0 26,900 0 
Table 4.8.B. Ship schedules chosen for units 8 - 10 in the single Major Regional Conflict, 
using the explicit delay generation. 
2. Dual Major Regional Conflict 
It is reasonable to assume that the second MRC does not begin until completing 
the loading of the last unit in the first MRC. This divides the problem into two parts. Any 
ship that delivers a unit in the first MRC incurs a 20 day delay from the discharge of its 
last unit to return to the US before it can begin to load any unit in the second MRC. 
a. Implicit Delay Generation 
Units are allowed to be loaded up to 14 days after their ALD for this 
problem.   For this scenario, 2,027 candidate ship schedules were generated in 1,185 
seconds, and CPLEX optimized the mixed integer program (2,027 rows, 10,412 columns, 
and 15 1,974 coefficients) in 8,130 seconds for both Major Regional Conflicts combined 
(with an integrality gap of 22%). However, the best incumbent solution was discovered 
after only 900 seconds. Unit ship assignments are in Table 4.9. There is a violation of 
only one port constraint (POD 2 on Day 27). The violation is repaired by delaying unit 2 
by one day. Table 4.9 reflects this change. 
UNIT SHIP DISCHARGE 
DATE 
DAYS LATE EXCESS 
SQFT 
EXCESS CONT. 
1 92 19 0 11,024 49 
2 1 27 0 
2 28 0 
4 27 0 
7 28 0 
83 30 3 
91 30 3 
94 30 3 
98 30 3 11,028 653 
3 15 27 1 
89 27 1 
93 27 1 
99 27 1 43,091 135 
4 87 32 6 16.275 50 
5 84 28 2 
85 28 2 0 73 
6 88 27 1 45.545 65 
Table 4.9. A. Ship schedules chosen for the dual MRC using implicit generation for the 
first six units (the remaining units are in Tables 4.9.B and 4.9.C). A negative number in 
the days late column indicates that the unit arrives early (and the ship schedule receives a 
small penalty of one). Originally there was one port constraint violated (POD 2 on day 
27). By delaying ships 2 and 7 (carrying unit 2) by one day, this port constraint is satisfied 
without disrupting any other ship schedule. These ship schedules are implementable. 
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UNIT SHIP DISCHARGE 
DATE 
DAYS LATE EXCESS 
SQFT 
EXCESS CONT. 
7 3 29 0 







90 33 4 
97 33 4 62.628 109 
8 95 46 5 46,060 89 
9 96 42 0 103,535 115 
10 25 40 0 105,096 8 
II 26 39 0 3.875 7 
12 21 39 0 38.030 0 
13 87 51 -1 195,515 135 
14 6 56 0 
7 60 4 
9 57 I 
13 57 1 
23 57 1 898,370 132 
15 2 57 1 
4 57 1 42,517 232 
16 20 58 2 82,649 
° 
Table 4.9.B.  Ship schedules chosen for the dual MRC using implicit generation for units 7 
-16.  The rest of the units are in Tables 4.9. A and 4.9.C. 
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UNIT SHIP DISCHARGE 
DATE 
DAYS LATE EXCESS 
SQFT 
EXCESS CONT 
17 22 55 0 
92 58 2 
1 57 1 75.800 145 
IS 99 64 0 14,5232 134 
19 3 68 -4 114,296 159 
20 96 74 0 192,168 156 
21 97 84 0 107,558 117 
22 85 80 -3 
87 83 0 
90 79 -3 257,002 252 
23 26 84 0 
83 79 -3 25,497 61 
24 86 79 -3 
88 79 -3 252,908 206 
25 99 96 0 115,151 117 
26 3 98 -6 17,870 114 
27 83 99 -5 123,466 103 
28 99 116 0 67,068 98 
29 87 109 -5 
90 109 -5 
96 109 -5 
97 109 -5 113,222 275 
30 85 109 -5 
86 109 -5 
88 109 -5 97,845 178 
31 3 114 0 9,414 111 
Table 4.9 C.  Ship schedules chosen for units 17 
using implicit delay generation. 
31 in the dual Major Regional Conflict, 
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b. Explicit Delay Generation 
The maximum number of days late to pick up a unit is 7 days for this 
problem   For this scenario, 2,543 candidate ship schedules were generated in 1320 
seconds, and CPLEX optimized the mixed integer program (2,543 rows, 22,245 columns, 
and 309,555 coefficients) in 4,271 seconds for both Major Regional Conflicts combined 
(v/.-i:n an integrality gap of 9.91%).  Units 2, 3, 7, and 14 are not fully transported (Table 
4.10).  A.n excess in square feet or containers means that there is more ship space available 
rof the set of ships moving that unit. Units 7 and 14 have a negative container excess. 
I here is probably enough square feet excess to move both units. Units 2 an 3 each have a 
negative excess of square feet. There is probably enough positive container excess to 
compensate for the lack of square feet for unit 3, but not for unit 2. 
The resulting ship schedules are not implementable. Comparing these 
schedules with the results using the implicit delay generation (Table 4.9) shows that 
implicit results are much better. Increasing the days late a unit can be loaded after its 
ALD from 7 to 14 might produce enough additional candidate schedules to render better 
results, but resulting MPS files were difficult to read into CPLEX. 
Although units 19 and 20 have different POEs, combining them into one 
unit at two different locations would allow a more efficient use of the ships at a very small 
increase in lateness. 
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UNIT SHIP DISCHARGE 
DATE 
DAYS LATE EXCESS 
SQFT 
EXCESS CONT. 
1 84 19 0 11.024 49 
o 2 26 0 
4 26 0 
5 26 0 
6 26 0 
7 26 0 -816,000 115 
3 83 27 1 
88 27 I 
89 27 1 
96 30 3 183.341 285 
4 1 28 1 -113.025 52 
5 85 28 1 
86 28 1 
87 28 1 259.921 253 
6 92 30 3 45,545 65 
Table 4.10. A. S lip schedules ch osen for the dua MRC using exp licit generation for the 
first six units (the remaining units are in Tables 4.10.B and 4. IOC). If units 19 and 20 are 
combined, their transportation requires only one ship. A comparison between any unit 
that has negative excess space in one category and positive excess space in the other 
reveals that all units except unit 2 can be completely transported. These schedules are not 
implementable. The implicit delay generation yields much better results since it implicitly 
considers many more possible schedules with far fewer binary variables and required only 
minimal post processing. 
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UNIT SHIP DISCHARGE 
DATE 
DAYS LATE EXCESS 
SQFT 
EXCESS CONT. 
7 3 29 0 














19 30 136.128 -131 
8 90 45 4 95.560 135 
9 98 42 1 103.535 115 
10 95 43 2 195.846 158 
II 84 40 0 242,405 157 
12 97 42 1 128,780 147 
13 9 50 0 55,265 0 
14 17 57 1 
20 57 1 
21 57 1 
22 57 1 
23 57 1 143,671 
-172 
15 93 57 1 8.617 48 
16 99 62 6 173,399 148 
Table4.10.B.  S lip schedules ch( Dsen for the dual MRC using imp licit generation f or units 
7-16 The rest of the units are in Tables 4.10. A and 4. IOC. 
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UNIT SHIP DISCHARGE 
DATE 
DAYS LATE EXCESS 
SQFT 
EXCESS CONT. 
17 91 58 2 
94 58 2 3,350 113 
18 26 63 0 54,482 0 
19 5 67 0 114,296 159 
2(1 97 74 0 192,168 156 
*19 &20 97 74 7 141.336 131 
21 5 84 0 27,758 119 
22 84 79 -3 
86 80 _2 257,002 72 
23 1 78 -4 
95 79 -3 85.227 213 
24 90 79 -3 
98 80 _2 203,408 206 
25 97 94 0 115,151 117 
26 1 98 -6 17,870 114 
27 94 100 -4 73,966 101 
28 96 113 -1 67,068 98 
29 83 110 -4 
85 111 -3 
87 112 .2 
93 110 -4 212,222 275 
30 89 110 -4 
91 110 -4 
92 110 -4 97.845 178 
31 2 108 -6 9,414 111 
Table 4.10.C.  S lip schedules ch osen for units 17 - 31 in the dual Major Regional 
Conflict, using the explicit delay generation. 
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V    CONCLUSIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The best set of ship schedules for a strategic sealift operation can be selected in an 
optimal manner at least if the candidate schedules are limited to good, face valid 
schedules. This process has two parts: generating good candidate ship schedules, and 
optimally selecting a subset of these. When generating candidate ship schedules, the total 
number of possible schedules for a given deployment is very large, and could make the 
subsequent optimization difficult. Therefore, only candidate ship schedules with a realistic 
chance of implementation are generated. The schedule generator tries to load and 
discharge units as soon as possible. However, it can be advantageous to delay the ships to 
avoid port congestion. Two delaying tactics (implicit and explicit) have been suggested. 
Implicit delay generation has the advantage of producing less candidate ship schedules 
than explicit delay generation. Candidate ship schedules can be generated in under 25 
minutes for either the single or dual MRC scenario 
The optimization model selects an implementable subset of the candidate ship 
schedules for both the single and dual MRC scenarios. The implicit delay produces less 
candidate schedules, but yields better results 
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B.   FUTURE RESEARCH 
A complete decision support system for Strategic Sealift optimization will require 
additional work.  The research reported here focuses on the most innovative technology: 
optimization. 
The schedule generator developed here captures just enough realism at a daily 
level of detail to support the optimization demonstration. After all, the schedule generator 
is principally an identity simulation of ports, ships, units, and their interactions — 
simulation details already well studied and understood by others. We treat available 
square feet and container space as separate ship capabilities, when in fact there is some 
substitutability between these. This provides an opportunity to recognize such limitations 
in the optimization model or we may not need to express either of these limitations 
explicitly at all.  It may suffice for the generator to simply inform the optimization that the 
schedule is admissible and conveys a set of units in some way not specified, except for the 
overall schedule penalty. It is also possible for an intelligent generator to render sets of 
related candidate ship schedules, or ship schedule packages, and convey these to the 
optimizer as a cohort.  This mimics human schedulers who worry about a complete 
coordinated sealift rather than daily details for individual ships. 
Best results will likely be achieved by mating the schedule generator and the 
optimizer. The generator would still produce an initial, seed subset of good alternate 
candidate schedules for each ship. But, given a look at an optimized incumbent sealift 
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selected from the restricted set of initial candidates, the generator would also generate 
additional candidate schedules to offer help with infeasibilities in the incumbent plan. 
Cyclic interaction of the generator (to offer more alternatives) and the optimizer (to advise 
the best global incumbent yet seen) would offer enormous iterative improvements (see 
Graves, et al  1993 for similar advice from United Airlines) 
We have resorted to manual interpretation and post processing of optimized 
solutions. This is a surrogate for an automated, or at least semi-automated post 
processing procedure which requires much more real-world experience than we can bring 
to bear 
During an actual sealift, the guiding OPLAN and the underlying TPFDD change 
constantly   Responding to such changes will require a decision support system which has 
knowledge of the already-published schedules, honoring as many of these as possible 
while dealing with changes and alterations. The idea is to minimize turbulence caused by 
these changes   Persistence modeling (e.g., Brown, Dell, and Farmer [1995], and Brown, 
Dell, and Wood [ 1995]) provides a framework to produce optimally revised schedules that 
consider decisions that have already been made, but might need changing. 
A suite of all these components would be most enhanced by a well-designed 
graphical user interface helping an expert scheduler employ his judgment and quickly 
making visible the global consequences of individual manual interventions. 
It is these global assessments that are the weakness of simulation, but the 




ALD Available to Load Date. 
AMP-MIDAS: Analysis Mobility Platform - Model for Intertheater Deployment by Air 
and Sea. 
BB   Break Bulk 
CINC   Commander-In-Chief 
EAD   Earliest Arrival Date. 
FSS: Fast Sealift Ship 
JFAST: Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation. 
JOPES: Joint Operational Planning System. 
LAD   Latest Arrival Date. 
LMSR:  Large Medium Speed RO/RO 
LO/LO:  Lift-On/ Lift-Off 
MRC: Major Regional Conflict 
MSC   Military Sealift Command 
MTMC   Military Traffic Management Command. 
OPLAN: Operations Plan. 
POD   Port of Debarkation 
POE   Port of Embarkation. 
ROS: Readiness Operating Status. 
RO/RO   Roll-On/Roll-Off 
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RRF   Ready Reserve Fleet 
TPFDD   Time Phased Force Deployment Data 
US ALE A   United States Army Logistics Evaluation Agency 
USTRANSCOM   United States Transportation Command. 
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